These brief reflections flow from readings, observations, and conversations occasioned by a return, some years after an earlier sojourn as a student, to Paris this spring for a short period of lecturing at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en sciences sociales. I have unabashedly focused on scholars and developments that seem most promising or valuable to me, and I do not pretend to speak either authoritatively or comprehensively; but for colleagues in North America who wish to keep abreast of political developments in the remarkably influential intellectual life of Paris, my impressions may at least prove a stimulating complement to better-informed opinions and to more sustained study at a distance.
I will not try to assess or predict the fastbreaking current events on the French political scene, but the underlying spirit of contemporary French politics may perhaps best be characterized in terms like "normalization," "routinization," or even "banalization": we seem to be witnessing the long-delayed (and possibly only temporary or short-lived) maturing and acceptance of liberalism within France. The posing of grand alternatives and the evocation of world-historical themes, by the Marxists on the Left and the Gaullists on the Right, has given way (for the time being at least) to a preoccupation with more down-to-earth economic and legal or institutional problems. It is true that Le Pen and his followers, playing on the widespread unease and the genuine dilemmas caused by the presence of a large immigrant and colonial Arab population, have injected the racial question into current debate; but thus far the potential for ugliness seems largely contained (compare Charlot, 1986 ). The vast majority of the electorate appears to desire an equilibrium among the parties that are heirs to Socialism and Gaullism. And those parties feel pressed to move toward and compete for the center, disencumbering themselves of their more radical or purist elements.
Foreign and defense policy continue to manifest the distinctive mark of De Gaulle-but of a Gaullism moderated and shorn of its posturing. I would venture to say that because France has chosen to pursue a role in the world that is at once more internationalist and more independent than that of perhaps any other member of the western alliance, she has been led to think more deeply about the nature of international relations. Accordingly, I think it is no accident that the most vital and substantial field of political science in France seems to be International Relations, where one finds the work of such notable scholars as Pierre Hassner and his colleagues at the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales. 1 Manent, 1977) . There are obvious resemblances here to the preoccupations of American "neo-conservatives" -and of some American "neo-liberals." But the French are on the whole better grounded in a rich theological-political tradition (from Pascal to Peguy and Walter Benjamin) and in the more idealistic branches of the continental liberal tradition (e.g., Spinoza, Kant, Constant). In the cast of Manent at least, the issues are approached with a singularly keen awareness of the deep opposition between religious thinking and the Enlightenment foundations of modern liberal theory. Still, in this last crucial respect Manent is exceptional rather than representative. In France as in America there prevails-even or especially among "sensible" neo-conservatives 2 To some extent, the treatment of the theologico-political question is part of a broader investigation into the potential sources for, and the endemic dangers to, spiritual elevation and genuinely reflective thought within modern democracy. This past spring three best-selling books provoked intense discussion of the collapse of higher humane education in France and in the Westem democracies generally: Bloom, 1987b (a translation of about two-thirds of The Closing of the American Minch; Finkelkraut, 1987; and Levy, 1987 .
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and neo-liberals-a strong wish to deny or avoid a searching confrontation with the almost immeasureable depths and
Nowadays it is becoming fashionable to quip that in the last ten years the French Revolution may have finally ended.
consequences of the religious question as it manifests itself within, and not only within, liberalism. These days one hears on all sides that religion is useful, perhaps necessary-perhaps, ultimately, the only granite foundation for the "work ethic" (Weber), or for Lockean contract and rights theory (John Dunn, Francois Furet), or for firm attachment to the principles of the American Constitution (John Patrick Diggins, Irving Kristol), or for vital civic community (Voegelin, Walzer, Wildavsky, Nozick)-but is religion true? Here the discussion fades.
There are other important respects in which the return to Weber and Tocqueville is only partial. The " n e o " in "neoTocquevillian" bespeaks a reluctance to embrace what are seen as the excessively aristocratic or even elitist leanings, and the consequent pessimistic withdrawal, of Tocqueville. To the extent that Aron followed Max Weber, he downplayed Weber's own tragic, quasiNietzschean, despair at the "iron cage" of modern democracy and bureaucracy. The outlook Aron exemplified-a perspective continued, in worthy fashion, by such heirs as Jean-Claude Casanova (Professor at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques and columnist for L'Express) and Alain Besancon (Director of Studies at L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes and columnist for L 'Express) -rests on a more sober or resigned endorsement of rationalism, the rule of law, human rights, a higher civil service, and an informed democratic electorate. In particular, Aron's lifelong posture towards DeGaulle showed how far Aron stood from Weber's politically naive fascination with "charismatic" leadership.
Still, Aron did follow Weber (and Schumpeter) in stressing the need for informing political analysis with rigorous attention to the principles of modern economics. This insistence not only set Aron at an opposite pole from the irresponsible fulminations of Sartreans and Marxists; it induced in his followers and, through them, in the current French intellectual milieu, a healthy openness to AngloAmerican, as well as Austrian (Hayek, Von Mises) and older French (JeanBaptiste Say, Frederic Bastiat), traditions of political economy. The renascence of liberal political theory has thus naturally led to an interest in Rawls's Theory of Justice, which appeared this spring in a French translation (1987) thinking and modeling. He in fact leveled against such theory some very severe reservations and criticisms. Self-serving and self-indulgent libertarianism; bloodless and narrow utilitarianism; scientistic thinking that was at once reductionist and abstractly universal; a so-called Kantianism that encouraged liberal softness and doctrinaire moralism: each of these powerful contemporary tendencies had the effect, in Aron's eyes, of extinguishing appreciation for the irreducibly political dimension of human existence-that core of unmoralistic statesmanship and citizenship which (Aron stressed) had been most sympathetically and lucidly delineated by Aristotle, Montesquieu, Burke, and Tocqueville. Like Bertrand de Jouvenel, Aron called for and promoted a philosophic reflection on past and present political practice. He had in mind studies that would not try to distort sound practice by forcing it into abstract theoretical models, but that would instead attempt to clarify such practice in a respectful, appreciative, but also philosophically critical spirit. A crucial aspect of Aron's legacy has consequently been a renewed quest to clarify the obscured but essential core of political life, on the basis of fruitful dialogues with major figures in the history of political philosophy (see, e.g., Bergounioux and Manin, 1979; Manin, 1985; Pasquino, 1987) . The effort has proceeded through the restoration of such categories of praxis as "deliberation," "judgment," "prudence," "political rhetoric," "tradition," and "character"-as a counter to theories of "decision-making," "public choice," "commitment," "image-building," "historical process," "the original position," and "personality."
Obviously, the tendencies of contemporary French thinking that I have highlighted are directly opposed to the most powerful currents in the American political science profession. Precisely for that reason, I am willing to let myself hope that these still-fragile developments in France may contribute to the rediscovery of a humanistic and politic liberal rationalism.
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